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 Flexibility and Social Protection 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent developments in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the issue of (the need for enhanced) flexibilisation of the labour market and (a 
concern for) protection and security of the workers involved has been on the agenda since the mid 
1980s. As of the mid 1990s deliberate policy efforts have been undertaken to balance and reconcile 
both flexibilisation and security in the labour market. These policies can be referred to as 
“flexicurity” strategies (Wilthagen, 1998), the core of which is represented by the Flexibility and 
Security Act, that came into force on 1 January 1999 (see Verhulp, 2001). This law has significantly 
altered both the scope and content of protection for flexible workforces in the Netherlands. 
Therefore I will start with a brief history and explanation of this law and its consequences. Next I 
will describe some important aspects of the most widespread categories of flex work in the 
Netherlands. This may foster the understanding of the regulations, facilities, issues and problems 
identified further in this report. 
 
A new approach was adopted at the end of 1995 when the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment, Ad Melkert (Labour Party), attempted, in a memorandum called ‘Flexibility and 
Security’ (Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid, December 1995), to strike a balance between flexibility and 
(social) security. This memorandum contains an interrelated set of starting points and proposals for 
modifying the dismissal protection enjoyed by employees in standard employment relationships 
(shorter probationary period, shorter notice periods, greater scope for extending fixed-term 
contracts without the obligation to give notice and apply for a permit), abolishing the permit system 
for temporary work agencies (TWA’s) in respect of their placement activities and, at the same time, 
enhancing the legal position of temporary agency workers, whose relationship with the agency is to 
be defined as far as possible as a standard employment contract. Another important policy 
document was the government’s 1996 memorandum “Working on security” (Werken aan 
zekerheid) in which the government deliberates whether flex workers’ access to the social security 
system (in particular the Unemployment benefit system) is too restricted. At the time sufficient 
evidence was lacking, the government argued, and therefore research was commissioned (see 
section 4). 
It is important to note that these flexibility and security measures put forward by the Dutch 
government pertain first and foremost to the legal position of employees, i.e. to their position in 
labour law (focusing on employment and job security) rather than directly to their social security 
position (though these positions are evidently related). Back then in the Dutch coalition 
government, nowadays referred to as the first ‘purple’ coalition of Labour, Liberals and Social 
Liberals, no agreement on the flexibility and security proposals could be reached. Subsequently, the 
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Labour Foundation was asked for its advice on this matter. The Labour Foundation is a consultation 
and advisory body at central level, which was established at the end of the Second World War 
(1945). Its members constitute the largest confederations of employers' and workers' organizations. 
Unlike the Socio-Economic Council, the Labour Foundation has no members or representatives 
from the government. 
Under the umbrella of the Foundation, which in the early 1990s was recovering from a period in the 
doldrums, employees' and employers' confederations managed to hammer out a detailed agreement 
on flexibility and security that was published in a memorandum of the same name on 3 April 1996 
(publication no. 2/96). Moreover, on 2 April 1993, the employers' organizations, the trade unions 
and the non-profit-making employment agency START had reached agreement on regulating the 
legal position of temporary agency workers after the new laws came into force. They had decided 
on a collective agreement that was to run for five years (see below; the collective agreements is 
currently be re-negotiated). 
The initiatives of the social partners were very much welcomed by the government. Nearly all the 
recommendations were taken up in a set of proposals for new bills. On 7 March 1997, the Flexibility 
and Security Bill was submitted to the lower house of the Dutch parliament, together with the 
Allocation of Workers via Intermediaries Bill (Wet allocatie arbeidskrachten door intermediars, 
WADI), which provided for the abrogation of TWA permits. The new legislation came into force on 
1 January 1999, its main aspects are summarized in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1:  Central aspects of the Dutch Flexibility and Security Act1
Flexibility Security 
-  Adjustment of the regulation of fixed term 
employment contracts: after 3 consecutive 
contracts or when the total length of consecutive 
contracts totals 3 years or more, a permanent 
contract exists (this used to apply to fixed-term 
contracts that has been extended once) 
-  the obligation for TWAs to be in possession of a 
permit has been withdrawn. The maximum term 
for this type of employment (formerly 6 months) 
is abolished as well. 
-  The notice period is in principal 1 month and 4 
months at maximum (used to be 6 months). 
-  The Public Employment Service (PES) dismissal 
notification procedure has been shortened and 
employees are no longer required to file a pro 
forma notice of objection to the Regional 
Director of the PES in the event of dismissal on 
economic or financial grounds in order to 
substantiate a claim for employment benefit 
 
 
-  Introduction of 2 so-called presumptions of law 
which strengthen the position of atypical workers 
(regarding the existence of an employment 
contract and the number of working hours agreed 
in that contract); the existence of an employment 
contract is more easily presumed 
-  a minimum entitlement to three hours' pay for 
on-call workers each time they are called in to 
work 
-  regulation of the risk of non-payment of wages in 
the event of there being no work for an on-call 
worker: the period over which employers may 
claim that they need not pay out wages for hours 
not worked has been reduced to six months 
-  a worker’s contract with a TWA is considered a 
regular employment contract; only in the first 26 
weeks are the agency and the agency worker 
allowed a certain degree of freedom with respect 
to starting and ending the employment 
relationship 
-  special dismissal protection has been introduced 
for employees engaged in trade-union activities  
-  dismissal cases at the district court (so-called 
rescission cases): the judge must check whether 
or not it is prohibited to terminate the 
employment contract with an employee, e.g. in 
the case of employees on sick leave; in the latter 
case the employer has to produce a re-integration 
plan for the employee to enable the judge to 
assess the feasibility of reinstatement  
 
 
The “normalization” of contingent work was further prompted and regulated by collective 
agreements. At the same time as the social partners operating under the umbrella of the Labour 
Foundation reached agreement on the outline of a Flexibility and Security Act, the employers 
(represented by  the General Association of Temporary Work Agencies (Algemene Bond 
Uitzendondernemingen, ABU), an association covering 90 per cent of all TWA’s and trade unions in 
the temporary agency work sector, concluded a collective agreement for the years 1999-2003 to 
deal with the consequences of the new law. The most important innovation in this collective 
agreement, which is binding at firm level for ABU members, is the introduction of a four-phase 
model in which temporary agency workers gradually acquire more rights, including rights to pension 
and training, as the length of the employment relationship increases.2 The four-phase model, which 
will be a relevant issue in section 2 of this report, is summarized in Figure 2 below.  
 
                                                 
1   Taken from Wilthagen and Rogowski, (2002). It should be noted that by means of a collective agreements it is 
possible to deviate from a nummer of provisions of the law.  
2   Another collective agreement in the sector, that of the Dutch Association of Placement and Temporay Work 
Enterprises (Nederlandse Bond van Bemiddelings- en Uitzendondernemingen, NBBU) also includes the 4-phases system. 
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Figure 2  The four-phase model as laid down in the Dutch collective agreement on temporary agency work3
Phase  When  Rights for agency worker 
I  First 26 weeks of temporary work  None  in  particular,  parties  may 
agree that the employment 
relationship ends without notice if 
the client firm runs out of work 
II  Next  6  months  Entitlements to pensions and 
training: the agency must discuss 
the worker’s training needs. If 
training is offered this has to be laid 
down in writing and the training 
goals and amount of training have 
to be specified 
III  At further continuation of the 
employment relationship or when 
entering a new one within 1 year 
The worker gets fixed-term 
contracts for one or more 3-month 
periods  
IV  After a total of 18 months at the 
same client firm or after 36 months 
of working at different client firms 
Worker gets a permanent contract 
 
The four-phase model came into effect in June 1999. Trade unions feared that TWA’s would not 
continue to deploy large numbers of agency workers or that they would delegate those workers to 
agencies not covered by the collective agreement in order to prevent them from getting a 
permanent contract. This scenario did not in fact transpire, with no more than 1200 agency workers 
having their employment relationships terminated. At the beginning of 2000, it was estimated that 
about 20 per cent of all temporary agency workers had a fixed term (phase 3) or permanent (phase 
4) contract with the agency. 
 
For a good understanding of the Dutch situation it should be kept in mind that over the past years 
the Netherlands have witnessed a high employment growth (notably in part-time jobs, flex jobs and, 
in general, as a result of increasing female participation in the labour market), a subsequent decrease 
of unemployment (towards a level of some 2.5 percent) and a very tight labour market. These 
circumstances have recently resulted in a slight decline of flex work (for workers it is easier to get a 
permanent or fixed term contract nowadays) and, moreover, in a relatively strong position for flex 
workers in terms of job or employment security. In these circumstances social protection is less of 
an issue than in a declining business cycle and relaxed labour market. 
 
Key features of prominent forms of flex work in the Netherlands 
In this part I briefly describe certain legal key aspects and definitions of some of the most common 
and widespread categories of flex work in the Netherlands. This serves to put the social protection 
issues or the lack of issues with those categories into perspective. 
Temporary agency work 
                                                 
3   Taken from Wilthagen and Rogowski, 2002. 
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This type of flex work has already been discussed above. It is important to notice that a temporary 
agency work contract is (since the Flexibility and Security Act) considered a normal temporary 
employment contract between the temporary work agency and the temporary agency worker. Only 
for the first 26 weeks different rules apply. During this period of time the contract does not 
automatically change into a regular contract.  Notwithstanding the normalization of temporary 
agency work in the Netherlands, the social security entitlements of temporary agency workers are 
not always self-evident and complications and limited access to notably the so-called employees 
insurances (unemployment, sickness and disability benefits) do occur. 
 
On-call work 
On-call work (oproepbanen) basically implies that the employers only call upon the worker if there 
is an actual need for (additional) labour. No fixed (number of) working hours exists. This type of flex 
work sometimes has major implications for social security entitlements (i.e. the so-called employees 
insurances). Three main types of on-call work contracts can be distinguished: 
•  On call contracts with a pre agreement: in this case it is the worker who decides whether 
he or she will actually accept to do the work. For each period of work (or “call”) a new 
employment contract is being concluded, the conditions of which have been agreed up 
front. After 4 subsequent contracts a permanent contract may exist. Unless this is the case 
the employer is not required to continue to pay the worker after a contract has ended. 
•  A contract without guaranteed working hours (“zero working hours contract”): the worker 
i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  d o  t h e  w o r k  w h e n  h e  o r  s h e is called upon. A continuing employment 
contract exists but this does not contain provisions on the number of working hours. Pay is 
only required for the hours worked (this has to be agreed in writing). After six months, 
however, the employer has to continue payment, whether or not he has actually work to 
offer (in this case the wage depends on the average number of hours worked during the last 
three months). In statistical overviews (see section 1 below) this type of work and contract 
is usually referred to as “substitute workers”. 
•  A contract with guaranteed working hours (“minimum – maximum contract”): A minimum 
number of (guaranteed) working hours per week, month or year are agreed upon. In 
addition a maximum number of hours can be agreed for the worker to be called upon by 
the employer. The worker is required to accept the calls until the maximum number of 
hours has been reached. The contract is a continuing contract with a guaranteed minimum 
number of hours (therefore, technically speaking, this contract mirrors a part-time contract 
rather than a real on call contract). Pay is required for the number of hours worked, but the 
guaranteed hours have to be paid anyway, whether the worker is called upon or not. If the 
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worker continues to work more than the guaranteed number of hours the worker can 
demand that the number of guaranteed hours be raised.  
For each call the on-call worker is entitled to be paid for a minimum of three hours in case of a 
contract for less that 15 hours per week and the lack of an agreement on (fixed) working hours. If 
conflict or uncertainty about the number of hours exists so-called “presumptions of law” 
(rechtsvermoedens) may be used. This means that the average number of working hours during the 




In the Netherlands, part-time work is regarded as work that is carried out regularly and voluntarily 
(on the basis of a employment contract), during working hours that are shorter than the working 
hours generally customary in the sector or company concerned (i.e. the normal working hours for 
full-time workers). Employees with a fixed-term contract, temporary employment agency workers 
and on-call workers – except when the latter actually work part-time - are not considered part-time 
workers. In Dutch law, the pro rata temporis-principle is strictly applied to part-time workers. This 
holds true not only for the position of the employee under civil and public labour law, but also for 
social security law and entitlements. Therefore there hardly is any issue regarding the social 
protection of part-time workers in the Netherlands. Indeed, part-time work represents a very 
common and widespread phenomenon in the country, especially among women. Almost 40 per cent 
of the employed labour force works part-time, while the figure for the European Union as a whole is 
less than 20 per cent. 
 
Fixed-term work 
Fixed-term work as well does not generate major social security issues in the Netherlands, because 
it usually clear when the employment contract has ended and what the duration of the contract has 
been. Fixed-term does of course imply a lower degree of job security than a permanent contract. 
 
Additional or subsidized employment 
This type of employment does not so much differ from “typical” employment in terms of flexibility 
but first and foremost in terms of the financing of the jobs involved. In the Netherlands two main 
types of additional employment exist. The first are the so-called ID jobs, which can be translated as 
“Inflow and Throughflow” jobs (inflow jobs are less demanding than the “throughflow” 
counterparts). ID jobs (for persons of age 23 and up and at least unemployed for one year) are 
based on a permanent contract but in the first year a fixed-term contract of one year may be 
agreed, on the condition that the intention is stated that a permanent contract will be granted if the 
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worker performs well. The contract is concluded between the worker (age 23 and up) and the 
employer. The second type of additional jobs is the WIW jobs. These jobs are based on the WIW 
scheme, the Wet inschakeling of werkzoekenden or “Law on the Deployment of Job-seekers”. In 
this case the workers is employed by the local municipality, for a maximum of two years (with a 
possibility of prolongation), and subsequently placed at an employer.  
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1 QUANTITATIVE DATA ON FLEXIBLE WORK PATTERNS
4
 
In this section statistics on flexible workforces are presented for the years 1992-2000 (most recent 
figures available, source: CBS/Statistics Netherlands): 
in absolute figures (table 1) 
as a proportion of total employment (table 2) 
as a % of new jobs created (to be added)  
split by sex (tables 3-5) 
 
Table 1.  Employees in flexible work patterns (in thousands), 1992-2000. 










1992 102 78 39 181 399
1993 98 79 36 179 393
1994 114 91 36 185 425
1995 149 105 34 189 477
1996 187 114 48 188 538
1997 207 121 43 195 566
1998 223 138 49 195 604
1999 210 112 44 205 571
2000 196 87 29 218 530
Source: CBS/Statistics Netherlands. 
 
 











1992 1.9 1.5 0.7 3.4 7.6
1993 1.9 1.5 0.7 3.4 7.5
1994 2.2 1.7 0.7 3.5 8.1
1995 2.8 2.0 0.6 3.5 8.9
1996 3.4 2.1 0.9 3.4 9.9
1997 3.7 2.1 0.8 3.5 10.0
1998 3.8 2.3 0.8 3.3 10.3
1999 3.5 1.8 0.7 3.4 9.4
2000 3.2 1.4 0.5 3.6 8.7


















1995 3436 217 3653 5.9 2285 349 2634 13.2
1996 3494 252 3746 6.7 2332 362 2694 13.4
                                                 
4   With thanks to Martijn van Velzen for his assistance in this matter. 
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1997 3537 314 3851 8.2 2379 408 2787 14.6
1998 3603 312 3915 8.0 2509 474 2983 15.9
1999 3705 317 4022 7.9 2622 488 3110 15.7
Source: CBS/Statistics Netherlands. 
 
 
Table 4.  Flexible employment arrangements as share of male and female employment 
 





workers Other flexible employees
Year 
1992 1.6 0.6 0.2 2.5
1993 1.6 0.7 0.2 2.4
1994 2.0 0.9 0.2 2.8
1995 2.7 1.0 0.2 2.7
1996 3.1 1.0 0.5 2.8
1997 3.3 1.0 0.4 2.7
1998 3.5 1.2 0.4 2.5
1999 2.8 1.1 0.3 2.8
2000 2.7 0.9 0.2 3.3
        





workers Other flexible employees
Year 
1992 2.5 3.0 1.6 5.0
1993 2.2 2.9 1.4 5.1
1994 2.5 3.2 1.4 4.8
1995 2.9 3.5 1.3 4.9
1996 4.0 3.8 1.5 4.6
1997 4.2 3.9 1.4 4.7
1998 4.2 4.2 1.5 4.6
1999 4.3 3.0 1.3 4.2


























Source: CBS/Statistics Netherlands 
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1995 2505 6063 5357 41.3 46.8
1996 2626 6187 5459 42.4 48.1
1997 2744 6400 5644 42.9 48.6
1998 2877 6609 5874 43.5 49.0
1999 2990 6805 6072 43.9 49.2
Total male and female
workers 
2000 3086 6917 6117 44.6 50.4
1995 688 3814 3322 18.0 20.7
1996 742 3872 3367 19.2 22.0
1997 789 3951 3427 20.0 23.0
1998 837 4047 3541 20.7 23.6
1999 873 4121 3624 21.2 24.1
Male workers 
2000 895 4174 3629 21.4 24.7
1995 1817 2249 2035 80.8 89.3
1996 1885 2315 2092 81.4 90.1
1997 1955 2450 2216 79.8 88.2
1998 2040 2562 2333 79.6 87.4
1999 2117 2684 2449 78.9 86.4
Female workers 
2000 2191 2743 2488 79.9 88.1
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
Main existing national quantitative sources in the Netherlands relevant to this survey: 
 
•  Statistics Netherlands (CBS) (www.cbs.nl) the main source for statistics. CBS also conducts, 
among other things, the Labour Force Survey (Enquête Beroepsbevolking EBB), as of 1987, 
which has turned into a “rotating”” panel study as of 1999, as well as the Socio-Economic 
Panel Study (Sociaal-Economisch Panelonderzoek, SEP), as of 1984; 
•  Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, annual publication of the “Social Memorandum” 
(Sociale Nota), studies by the Labour Inspectorate on e.g. collective agreements and the so-
called Employers Panel Survey (which contains data on 11,000 employees) (www.minszw.nl); 
•  Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP, Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau) (www.scp.nl), 
publication of the annual Social and Cultural Report and (as of 1975, but not on a annual 
basis) a survey concerning the way people spend their time (Tijdbestedingsonderzoek); 
•  OSA/Institute for Labour Studies (www.osa.uvt.nl), which manages among other things the 
OSA Labour Market Supply Panel Data, a longitudinal data set for the period 1985-2000. 
•  The Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions (FNV) in cooperation with the Amsterdam 
Institute of Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) of the University of Amsterdam has recently 
established an electronic databases on collective agreements and another one on wages and 
wage differences (CAO-Databank), www.fnv.nl and www.uva-aias.net 
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•  The General Association of Temporary Work Agencies (Algemene Bond 
Uitzendondernemingen, ABU) publishes in and outflow surveys of temporary agency workers 
– www.abu.nl These surveys are conducted by the NEI (Netherlands Economic Institute): 
www.nei.nl/en/ 
•  TNO Work and Employment (TNO Arbeid): Two-yearly TNO Work Situation Survey (no 
cohort study, sample changes, but the questions remain unchanged). TNO Work and 
Employment has also access to and made analysis of the Employers Panel Study mentioned 
above (see Goudswaard, 2000); www.arbeid.tno.nl 
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2 SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR FLEXIBLE WORKERS 
2.1 UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
2.1.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 
Workers in dependant labour are mandatory insured against the consequences of the loss of income 
and against medical costs (on the latter see section 2.6). Self-employed persons and so-called 
“professionals” (freelance workers, musicians) are not included in these “employees insurance” 
schemes: the Unemployment Benefits scheme, the Sickness Benefits scheme and the Disability 
Benefits scheme. As of 1998 self-employed persons can rely on a specific (modest) disability scheme 
(see section 2.5) and self-employed persons with low income are (as of 1 January 2000) mandatory 
insured under the National Health Insurance (Ziekenfonds). 
 
The major criterion for access to the employees insurances deals with the existence of an 
“employment relationship” (dienstbetrekking) (cf. Article 2 of the three distinct laws on 
unemployment, sickness and disability schemes). However, some labour relations can “socially” be 
put on par with a proper employment relationship (Articles 4-5 of the three laws and the Royal 
Decree of 1986). In these cases the work has to be conducted “in person” by the worker and three 
specific requirements have to be met: 
•  work is usually being conducted during at least two days per week 
•  the labour contract has been concluded for a continuous period of time of at least 30 days 
and 
•  the gross wage usually amounts to at least 40 percent of the legal minimum wage. 
 
As will be described further on in this report some categories of flex workers encounter problems 
with these very criterions. 
 
A number of schemes exist to provide workers with an income in case of unemployment. The most 
prominent scheme is the Unemployment Benefits scheme (Werkloosheidswet, WW). Workers that 
are not or no longer entitled to an unemployment benefit can apply for a benefit on the basis of the 
General Assistance or Welfare scheme (Algemene Bijstandswet, ABW) or the Law on Income 
Provision to Elderly or Partially Disabled Workers (Wet inkomensvoorziening oudere en gedeeltelijk 
arbeidsongeschikte werknemers, IOAW). The latter scheme will be dealt with in this section, whereas 
the General Assistance scheme will be dwelled upon in the next section.  
The Unemployment Benefits scheme is meant for workers that have lost their job and provide 
insurance to workers below the age of 65, including flex workers and people that work in so-called 
sheltered workplaces (sociale werkplaatsen). Under certain conditions homeworkers, musicians and 
other artists as well fall into the scope of this scheme.  
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2.1.2 ACCESS 
A person is entitled to a full-blown “wage-related” unemployment benefit if he or she meets the 
following conditions: 
He or she has lost at least 5 working hours per week (or at least half of the working hours in case 
of a working week of less than 10 hours). This is the so-called weeks-criterion. Moreover, he or she 
has no entitlements to wages pertaining to the lost hours and should be available for paid work. 
•  The so-called “29 out of 39 weeks” condition: the workers should have worked for at least 
26 weeks during the last 39 weeks previously to the first day of unemployment. This is the 
so-called weeks-requirement. It is not required that these 26 weeks are full working weeks: 
one day per week is sufficient to have this week qualifying to a “working week”. Moreover, 
holiday weeks in which wages have continued to be paid count as working weeks. For some 
professions, e.g. musicians, artists and seasonal workers the requirements are less strict 
(either 13, 16 or 20 weeks suffice). 
•  The “4 out 5 years” condition: the worker should have worked for a minimum of 52 days 
during at least 4 (calendar) years during the 5 years preceding the first day of 
unemployment. It is not required that these 52 days be an continuous/uninterrupted period 
of time (so one day per week is enough) and the number of hours of work are irrelevant. 
(Calendar) years during which a person has taken care for children below the age of 6 are 
fully taken into account in this calculation and years in which one has taken care for children 
between the age of 6 and 12 count for 50 percent. 
•  There is no reason for exclusion from this scheme, such as the fact the a person has a 
benefit on the basis of the Sickness Absenteeism scheme or a Disability benefit in case of full 
disability (see section 2.5). 
A number of additional requirements apply to persons in unemployment benefit schemes, such as 
the fact that the unemployment should not be “culpable” (i.e. not caused by any act of behaviour of 
the applicant which could be known to result in unemployment). E.g. in some cases where the 
worker quits a permanent job to conclude a fixed-term contract the issue of culpability may arise.  
Furthermore persons in the unemployment scheme should actively engage in job seeking, accept 
suitable job offers (passende arbeid) and comply with administrative procedures. 
 
2.1.3 RATE AND DURATION 
The Unemployment Benefit scheme contains three different types of benefits: 
•  The short-time benefit for a maximum of 6 months. This benefit applies to the worker that 
meets the “weeks-requirement” but does not meet the “years-requirement” (see above). 
The benefit represents 70 percent of the legal minimum wage (see section 2.2) and is 
available on the first day of unemployment. 
14   UvA-AIAS Flexibility and Social Protection 
•  The wage-related benefit, which applies to a person that meets with all the conditions and 
requirements. The benefit represents 70 percent of the daily wages (dagloon), calculated on 
the basis of the average daily wages during the 26 weeks preceding unemployment (leaving 
aside those elements of the wages that do not have a permanent status). For this calculation 
a maximum daily wage exists of € 159.95 in 2002 (new daily wages are being set twice a 
year). The duration of the wage-related benefit scheme depends on the work record of the 
person (the longer one’s record, the longer the duration). The maximum duration is 5 
years. See table 2.1 below. 
 
Table 2.1 
Duration of unemployment benefit scheme
Work record  Duration  
4 years  6 months
5 - 10 years  9 months
10 - 15 years  1 year
15 - 20 years  1,5 year
20 - 25 years  2 years
25 - 30 years  2,5 years
30 - 35 years  3 years
35 - 40 years  4 years
40 years and more  5 years
 
A continued benefit. After the expiration of the wage-related benefit scheme a person may be eligible 
for a continued benefit. This benefit represents 70 percent of the legal minimum wage instead of 70 
percent of the person’s own wages. For persons that were younger than 57,5 year on the first day 
of unemployment this benefit is limited to 2 years, whereas persons of the age of 57.5 and up are 
entitled to a benefit for a maximum period of 3,5 years. In case the daily wage is less than the legal 
minimum wage, the continued benefit will be based on this lower amount. Supplements are means-
tested. The scheme, as all unemployment schemes, is individualized, i.e. the income position of a 
partner is irrelevant. 
 
After the maximum duration of an unemployment benefit a person can apply for a social assistance 
benefit or, if he or she is of the age of 50 and up, apply for a benefit on the basis of the Law on 
Income Provision to Elderly or Partially Disabled Workers (IOAW). The latter benefit can possibly 
be supplemented by an extra allowance (toeslag) in case the benefit falls below the social minimum 
that applies to this person. For the self-employed a similar scheme exists. Both schemes are related 
to the legal minimum wage and are (partially) means-tested; the IOWA limits means-testing to other 
revenues from paid work. 
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2.1 MINIMUM GUARANTEED INCOME SCHEMES.  
2.2.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 
In Dutch social laws the concept of the social minimum is frequently used. The social minimum is 
the amount of money that a person needs for his or her necessities of life. The social minimum is 
derived from the legal minimum wage. For a workers aged 23 or up the minimum wage (in case of a 
full working week, i.e. up to a maximum of 40 hours) is – as of 1 January 2002 - € 55.68 per day, € 
278.40 per week and € 1206.60 per month. The rate of the social minimum depends on a person’s 
situation, e.g. the social minimum for a single person is lower than for a person with children. The 
social minimum for 3 groups is presented in table 2.2 below. 
 
Table 2.2  Social minimum for different situations 
 
Situation      %  of  minimum  wage   amount 
2 3   y e a r   o r   m o r e :       7 0 %         €   8 4 4 . 6 2  
single  parents:      90%        €  1085.94 




To prevent unemployment or (full) Disability benefits from falling below the social minimum so-
called increases (kopjes) exist to supplement these benefits. Generally, social assistance is considered 
a supplement for social insurances. The main forms of social assistance are the General Assistance 
Scheme (Algemene Bijstandswet, ABW) and the income provision schemes for elderly workers and 
self-employed which have already been discussed briefly in section 2.1. 
 
2.2.2 ACCESS  
The General Assistance scheme is open to every person that has insufficient means to deal with the 
costs of subsistence. It provides a minimum income and it is explicitly considered a supplementary 
scheme. Additional income is being taken into account and affects the benefit. The General 
Assistance scheme is of an individualized nature: every single case is being judged on its own merits. 
National standards and norms exists but can be supplemented by extra allowances. This scheme, 
also referred to as “welfare” in other countries, consists of two parts: general assistance and special 
assistance. General assistance is being provided for the general costs of subsistence existence (food, 
drinks, housing, electricity, water et cetera), whereas special assistance is aimed at specific situations, 
circumstances and needs. Every person that resides legally in the Netherlands and has insufficient 
financial means to cover the costs of subsistence is entitled to a General Assistance benefit, 
flexworkers included. Exceptions are young people below the age of 18, prisoners, students who 
have received an educational allowance from the government et cetera. 
A number of – general - conditions and requirements apply. A person that is granted a General 
Assistance benefit is expected to take every effort to try and cover his or her own costs of 
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subsistence. His or her partner can also be expected to seek for a paid job, depending on the (social 
and medical) circumstances. A person that takes care of a child below the age of 5 is exempted from 
actively applying for a job; in case of children between the age of 5 and 12 it depends on the 
individual circumstances whether such an exemption will be issued. The Municipal Welfare Services 
that implement the General Assistance benefit scheme will offer training or work experience 
programmes to those persons that do not manage to find a job. The recipient’s property is taken 
into account, leaving certain minimum amounts aside. 
 
2.2.3 RATE AND DURATION 
National norms/standard rates exist for persons between 21 and 65 on the one hand and persons of 
the age of 65 and up on the other. The law distinguishes between single persons, single parents and 
married persons/unmarried persons living together. There is a so-called norm rate for each group. 
For persons age 21 - 65 the following norms apply:  
•  50% of the netto minimum wage for a single person 
•  70% of the netto minimum wage for a single parent 
•  100% of the netto minimum wage for married persons/persons living together 
Extra allowances are possible up to 20 percent of the netto minimum wage for single persons and 
single parents (but additional income will be taken into account in that case).  
Norm/standard rates are set twice a year. The General Assistance rates as of 1 January 2002 are as 
follows (table 2.3): 
 
Table 2.3  Standard rates for General Assistance (situation January 1 2002) 
18 - 21 year, without children       
   per month holiday allowance total
Married couples/persons living together, both < 21 year   € 361.84 € 18.24 € 390.08
Married couples/persons living together – one person < 21 year € 704.43 € 35.52 € 739.95
Single person  € 180.92 € 9.12 € 190.04
18 - 21 jaar, with children       
  Per month holiday allowance total
 Married couples/persons living together, both < age 21   € 571.24 € 28.80 € 600.04
Married couples/persons living together – one person < age 21   € 913.83 € 46.08 € 959.91
Single parent  € 390.32 € 19.68 € 410.00
 
21 - 65 year       
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   per month holiday allowance total
Married couples/persons living together  € 1.047.02 € 52.79 € 1.099.81
Single parent  € 732.92 € 36.95 € 769.87
Single person  € 523.51 € 26.40 € 549.91
Maximum extra allowance  € 209.40 € 10.56 € 219.96
65 years and up      
   per month holiday allowance total
Married couples/persons living together, both age 65 and up   € 1093.60 € 55.14 € 1148.74
Married couples/persons living together, one person age < 65   € 1102.61 € 55.59 € 1158.20
Single parent  € 985.55 € 49.69 € 1035.24
Single person  € 776.16 € 39.13 € 815.29
 
2.3 RETIREMENT SCHEMES 
2.3.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 
Every inhabitant in the Netherlands is entitled to a state pension as of the age of 65 (first pillar or 
tier). This pension is based on the Old Age Pensions Act (Algemene ouderdomswet, AOW). Workers 
(i.e. those in paid work) usually have a supplementary pension from a sector or company pension 
fund (second tier) and they themselves can also provide for additional private pension, if they wish 
so and can afford it (third tier). 
 
2.3.2 ACCESS 
The state provided old age pension is granted to every resident of the country and also to those 
persons that have paid taxes on w a g e s  o r  s a l a r i e s  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s .  B e y o n d  t h e  a g e  o f  6 5  
entitlements to (the continuation of) other social security benefits is fairly limited. 
 
Many, but certainly not all workers are entitled to a supplementary pension paid by a 
company/branch pension fund. These entitlements are part of the working conditions, negotiated by 
employers, employees and their representatives. For an individual employer it is not mandatory to 
provide a company pension scheme, except when a pension funds exist in his or her sector of 
business. Usually both the employer and the worker contribute to the pension fund (pension 
premium) – sometimes the worker is exempted from contributions or only has to contribute 
beyond a certain income level. No taxed and social premiums have to be paid with respect to 
pension premiums. Increasingly flexible pension and pre pension schemes are established that enable 
a worker – on the basis of a saving scheme - to retire before the age of 65 and/or retire part-time 
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first and full-time later (these flexible schemes tend to replace the existing early retirement schemes, 
VUT, vervroegde uittreding in Dutch, which are no longer supported fiscally by the government). 
One of the main problems regarding the second tier or pillar pension is the so-called “breach of 
pension” phenomenon (pensioenbreuk), which occurs when the participation in a company or sector 
pension funds is halted. This can e.g. happen when a worker changes jobs, becomes unemployed or 
disabled. Workers that temporarily quit paid employment to take care of their children can also 
suffer from a loss of pensions. Legal measures have been (and are being) taken to reduce this 
problem. E.g. regulations exist for the transfer of worth of pensions, thus enabling workers to 
transfer their pension entitlements to the company fund of their new employer without suffering a 
loss (or reduced worth) of entitlements. 
  The main collective agreement for the temporary work agencies (ABU-CAO) stipulates that 
temporary agency workers at the age of 21 and up who have worked for 26 weeks for the same 
temporary work agency have a right to be included in a pension scheme. In the case the worker 
starts working for another temporary work agency he will continue to participate in the pension 
scheme. However, if he interrupts work for 1 year or more this participation ends and he or she 
will have to “build up” another 26 weeks before participation can be resumed. The pensions 
entitlements that were already obtained are maintained. Participation in the pension scheme is 
mandatory for the temporary agency worker. The premium rate is 3.5 percent of the gross wage. 
The worker himself or herself pays a maximum of one third of the premium. To give an example: 
Randstad, on of the major TWA’s has created a pension scheme for its workers called “Flexicurity”. 
 
Certain categories of workers, notably the self-employed, are depending on private pension 
schemes to create supplementary pension payments (besides the general old age pension provided 
by the state). Annuity insurance represents the most common example of private pension schemes: 
the worker pays a premium to the insurance company (tax-deductible to a certain extent, also 
depending on the individual’s – calculated – pension gap) and in return receives a certain fixed 
benefit at a certain age. 
 
The Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions FNV has estimated in the past that some half million 
workers lack a supplementary pension scheme (it is not clear how accurate this estimation is for the 
present situation). This is referred to as the “blind spot” in pension schemes. Partly this pertains to 
companies and sectors that have not created any provision at all and partly this pertains to 
categories of workers that are being excluded from existing schemes, such as some groups of flex 
workers. As far as women are excluded this may represent cases of unequal treatment and a 
violation of European treaties and guidelines. Currently 91 percent of the employees are “building 
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up” up a so-called supplementary pension in addition to the state pension (in 1985 the figure was 85 
percent). 
 
2.3.2 RATE AND DURATION 
The old age pension ends at the death of the recipient. The rate of the pension is derived from the 
minimum wage (see section 2.2) and the recipients’ private situation. A distinction is made between  
•  unmarried single persons: 70% of the minimum wage 
•  unmarried single persons with a child below the age of 18: 90% of the minimum wage 
married persons: each 50% of the minimum wage 
•  unmarried persons living together: each 50% of the minimum wage 
Recipients with a partner below the age of 65 receive a pension of 50% of the minimum wage and 
may be entitled to an extra allowance, depending on the younger partner’s income and on the date 
on which the pension has been granted, i.e. before or after 1 February 1994 (this provision expires 
for persons becoming 65 as of January 1 2015). As of 1 January 2002 the following rates apply (see 
table 2.4): 
 
Table 2.4  Old age pension rates 
   gross per
month
Gross holiday allowance per
month
Married person, partner < age of 65   € 598.07 € 31.04
Married person with maximum extra allowance  € 1196.14 € 62.08
Married persons, without extra allowance , partner <
age 65  
(Old age pension before February 1 1994)  
€ 869.24 € 43.45
Unmarried persons  € 869.24 € 43.45
Unmarried persons with a child < age of 18   € 1077.54 € 55.87
Maximum allowance €  326.90 per month (pension before 1 February
1994)  
  




Concerning supplementary company pension benefits, the standard pension age is 65. Full company 
pension benefits are normally being obtained over a period of 40 years. The most common used 
standard of a full pension (including the state-provided old age pension) amounts to 70 percent of 
last earned income. That means that per year 1.75 percent of the pension is being “build up” (1.75% 
x 40 = 70%). 
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2.4 PARENTAL ALLOWANCES, SERVICES, AND ACCESS TO FACILITIES 
2.4.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 
Parental allowances are meant as a contribution to the coverage of the costs of raising children and 
caring for them. In the Netherlands “family allowance” (kinderbijslag) is one of the national 
insurances (such as the old age pension discussed here above). This implies that generally every 
inhabitant of the country, younger than 65, with children has an entitlement to family allowance 
(General Act on Family Allowance). The access, rates and duration of family allowances will be 
discussed in the next (sub) sections. As will be explained, family allowances are a national facility that 
is unrelated to employment status and work records. At the end of this section of the report 
(section 2.4) specific attention will also be paid to the access, rates and duration of leave schemes, as 
a type of facilities which are not unrelated to employment status and work records. 
 
2.4.2 ACCESS 
Inhabitants of the Netherlands and also foreign persons that work in paid employment in the 
country have a right to family allowance for their own children, stepchildren of foster children up to 
the age of 18. Flex workers are no exception to this rule. For children between the age of 16 and 18 
there is an entitlement to family allowance if those children are in education, unemployed or 
disabled and have a limited income of their own. Income from paid employment by the child can 
have consequences for family allowance, as this income is considered to (partially) contribute to the 
coverage of the child’s costs of subsistence. An exception is made for a netto amount of € 1135 per 
quarter of the year (family allowance is paid each quarter of the year) in 2002 (€ 1606 for children 
not living at home). Children in education as of the age of 18 are entitled to student grants from the 
government. Parents are obliged to inform the authorities on relevant changes (change of address, 
divorce, stay abroad et cetera). 
 
2.4.3 RATE AND DURATION 
Family allowance rates depend on the age of the child and on the number of children in the family; 
the latter only for children born before 1 January 1995. Norm rates are set twice a year. As of 
January 1 2002 the following rates apply per quarter (see table 2.5): 
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Table 2.5  Family allowances rates (as of January 1 2002) 
Children born before January 1 1995 
   6 – 11 year 12 -17 year
Number of children in family     
1  € 205.06 € 241.25
2  € 231.63 € 272.51
3   € 240,.9 € 282.93
4  € 259.96 € 305.84
5   € 271.64 € 319.58
6   € 279.43 € 328.74
 
 
Children born on or after January 1 1995 (irrespective of family size)  
Age   Allowance
0 - 6   € 168.88
6 - 12   € 205.06
12 - 18  € 241.25
 
2.4.4 LEAVE SCHEMES 
As in many other countries in the Netherlands increasing facilities (have come to) exist for a variety 
of leave: parental leave, maternity leave, calamity and short-term absenteeism leave, career break 
leave, short-term care leave et cetera. In this report we will refrain from presenting and discussing 
the distinct features of these schemes, but rather look at the restrictions for (types) of flexible 
workforces to make use of these schemes. For the majority of statutory leave schemes, which have 
recently been brought under the heading of the new Law on Work and Care (Wet Arbeid en Zorg, 
WAZ; in force as of 1 December 2001) there is an important requirement of “employeeship”, as 
defined in article 1.1 of the Act, which refers to the existence of either an employment contract 
under private law or an appointment under public law (e.g. as a civil servant). This means that the 
entitlements of some categories of flex workers are limited. Self-employed persons, musicians and 
artists e.g., can only get a benefit on behalf of maternity leave or adoption leave (unless their 
relationship with a client de facto represents an employment contract).  
On-call workers who are free to work the hours they prefer and who do not have fixed hours 
cannot claim calamity or care leave at his or her employer. This is different when the worker does 
work on fixed moments. On-call workers will usually be entitled to maternity and adoption leave, 
but if his or her work pattern is very irregular it may be difficult to determine the actual length of 
the leave period. This problem has been softened by the 1999 Flexibility and Security Act that 
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stipulates (in article 7:610b of the Civil Code) that if an employment contract has lasted for at least 
three months, the agreed work in the next month can be assumed to equal the average of the last 
three months. The length of the maternity leave can thus be calculated. On-call workers are entitled 
to parental leave (versus their employer) provided that they have worked for their employer for at 
least one year. The statutory regulation of parental leave does not contain an entitlement to 
continued pay (5% of the collective agreements do), so that the calculation of the loss of income is 
no issue here. 
Workers on a fixed term contract and temporary agency workers have the same entitlements to 
leave schemes as workers with a permanent contract. In practice these categories of workers will 
also have some difficulties with the requirement of the one year reference period in the case of 
parental leave and in the case of career break leave (in the latter leave scheme financial 
compensation will be rather modest: about € 3 per weekly hour of leave with a maximum of € 
490.54 per month as of 1 January 2002). To prevent employers from rendering these rights illusory 
by repeating concluding short-term (less than 1 year) employment contracts with a worker the 
Work and Care Act stipulates (in article 6:3 and 7:7 sub 1) that employment contracts between the 
same parties will be added up on behalf of the calculation of the one-year-period, provided that the 
interruptions have been shorter than three months. Similar provisions apply in the case of 
employment contracts with more employers, which can be considered successors (e.g. a temporary 
agency worker who works for 6 months for the agency and subsequently is hired directly by the 
same employer). 
In case a fixed term contract or a temporary agency work contract expires during a period of 
maternity or adoption leave, the right to payment of the benefit will not be affected. The law (article 
3:10) contains a so-called “aftereffects” provision that is relevant to this situation. However, if such a 
contract ends during career break leave, than the entitlement to financial compensation ends as well. 
Finally, if a worker takes unpaid leave his employment contract and insurance for the 
Unemployment Benefit scheme continues (only the obligation to work and the entitlement to a 
wage have been postponed). For the Sickness Benefits Act and the Disability Act, however, it is 
assumed that no employment relationship exists during unpaid leave. Therefore these insurances do 
not continue (as there is no income, no loss of income is assumed to occur). After the period of 
unpaid leave (a maximum of 6 months) these insurances will be re-activated. 
 
2.5 SICKNESS AND DISABILITY 
2.5.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 
In the Netherlands a number of schemes exist that offer (income) protection in case of (long-term) 
sickness and disability. Some of these schemes are specifically designed for employees: the 1996 Law 
on the Extension of Pay in Case of Sickness (Wet uitbreiding loondoorbetaling bij ziekte, WULBZ), the 
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Sickness Benefits Act (Ziektewet) – for workers without employer - and the 1967 Disability Benefits 
Act (Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering, WAO). Next to these social insurances for 
employees other schemes exist for other categories of workers: the 1998 Disability Benefits Act for 
the Self-employed (Wet arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering zelfstandigen, WAZ) and the 1998 Disability 
Benefits Act for Early-disabled Persons (Wet arbeidsongeschiktheidsvoorziening jonggehandicapten, 
Wajong). Before I discuss the access, rates and duration of these schemes it is important to notice 
that social security in the Netherlands in case of sickness and disability is based on the principle of 
“risque social” (as opposed to “risque professionel”, which is the dominant principle in most 
countries). That is, workers who are unable to work because of sickness or disablement are entitled 
to social security benefits irrespective of the cause of the sickness or disablement. Whether the cause 
of sickness or disability is work-related or not is irrelevant under this principle.  
 
2.5.2 ACCESS 
Continuation of pay in case of sickness – the first scheme – depends on whether a person is an 
employee and has an employment contract. In that case it is the employer who is obliged to 
continue payments during the first year of sickness (in fact this measure represents a form of 
privatisation of sickness benefits aiming at enhancing employers’ responsibility for preventive policy 
and improving working conditions).  
 
If an employee is not entitled to continuation of pay, he or she may be entitled to a benefit based on 
the Sickness Benefits scheme (Ziektewet-uitkering or ziekengeld ) starting on the third day of sickness 
absenteeism. Workers with a fixed-term contract are entitled to a Sickness Benefit on the first day 
after the expiration of the contract (during the contract period they are entitled to continuation of 
pay by the employer). The employer is also obliged to continue payment in the case of on-call (stand 
by) workers who have a guaranteed (minimum) number of working hours. If such a guarantee is 
missing the work pattern during the 26 weeks preceding sickness is the decisive factor for 
determining whether an entitlement to continued pay exist. In case of temporary agency work the 
temporary work agency is obliged to continue pay after 26 weeks of – uninterrupted – work.  
No entitlement to continued pay exists if the worker has deliberately caused the sickness or if 
sickness results from ailments on which he or she has deliberately given false information in the 
recruitment stage. 
 
If no entitlement exist to continued pay by the employer (e.g. because the employment contract 
ends during the period of sickness, which is only possible under certain conditions, as there exist a 
general legal ban on dismissal during a period of sickness for the first two years) the Sickness Benefit 
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Act offers a safety net provision (financed by unemployment benefit premiums and reduced pay 
funds) to notably the following categories of workers: 
•  Workers with a temporary employment contract whose contract has expired, such as flex 
workers. On-call workers e.g. generally are neither entitled to continued pay nor to 
Sickness benefits apart from the periods when they are called upon. However, some 
exceptions exist in the form of a “after effect” of the insurance in the following situations: 
the worker has worked (nearly continuously) for two months and falls ill within one month 
following the last working day or the worker has worked at least 16 days during the last two 
months and falls ill within the 8 days following the last working day or the workers receives 
an Unemployment benefit. 
•  Specific categories such as homeworkers, musicians, artists and students on work 
placement/trainees 
•  Unemployed persons who are sick 
•  Women on maternity leave and women whose illness is related to pregnancy 
•  Workers whose employer has gone bankrupt 
•  Persons that donate organs 
•  Formerly disabled persons who have resumed work and subsequently fall ill; 
The voluntary insured and former Disability Benefit recipients during a period of 3 years after the 
start of the employment contract. 
 
If after one year the worker is still not able to resume work he or she is entitled to a Disability 
benefit on the basis of the Disability Benefits Act (WAO). This scheme insures the worker against 
the consequences of disability and the premium is to be paid by the employer to enhance his 
responsibility and his policies to prevent disability. This premium is split into a basic premium and a 
differentiated premium fixed per company depending on the disability costs the company has 
produced. A company is not obliged to pay the differentiated part and may in stead itself bear the 
risk to having to pay for the first five years of disability of its employees (this risk can be insured 
against in private insurance). 
To be eligible for this benefit a worker must still be at least 15 percent disabled for common labour 
after 52 weeks (the waiting period during which normally sickness benefits are granted). 
 
2.5.3 RATE AND DURATION 
The Law on the Extension of Pay in Case of Sickness stipulates that employers are obliged to 
continue paying sick employees 70 percent of their wages during the first year (52 weeks), starting 
on the first day of sickness (unless differently agreed in a collective agreement, then payment starts 
at the third day). The employer has to pay a minimum of 70 percent of the “benefit daily wage” 
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(uitkeringsdagloon) (with a maximum of € 159.99). If this amount is less than the legal minimum wage, 
the employers is required to pay the minimum wage. Collective agreements or individual employer 
contracts can, however, stipulate that the employer is required to pay 100 percent of the wage (this 
is often the case). The employer may deduct (legal) benefits or income that the employee receives 
during the period of sickness from his payment. If an employee falls ill again within the first 4 weeks 
after his or her recovery than his or her first week of sickness is added to the new period of 
sickness (in calculating the 52 weeks period).  
The employer may “re-insure” the financial risks of continued pay in case his employees fall ill at an 
insurance company (this is particularly relevant to small businesses). Both the employer and the 
employee himself have strong and extensive obligations to promote the reintegration of the worker. 
This responsibility has recently been enhanced by the new Improvement of Gatekeeper Act (Wet 
verbetering poortwachter), in force as of 1 April 1 2002. This law and many other laws aim at 
preventing long-term disability and the subsequent reliance on disability benefits – which is 
considered a major problem in the Netherlands as almost 1 million people are labelled disabled to 
work nowadays. 
 
A benefit on the basis of the Sickness Benefit Act is set at 70% of the so-called day wage. Generally 
that is 70 percent of the average gross earnings per day during the 13 weeks that precede the 
workers’ sickness. The maximum day wage is set at € 159.99. For some categories of workers, such 
as flex workers, the entitlement to a Sickness benefit takes effect on the third day of sickness (see 
below). 
A sickness benefit will be paid during a maximum period of 52 weeks uninterrupted sickness. 
Successive periods of sickness with an interruption of less than 4 weeks are added up. The Sickness 
Benefit Act is being implemented by the Workers Insurances Agency (Uitvoeringsinstituut 
Werknemersverzekering, a newly established – as of January 1, 2002 – national agency which replaces 
existing semi-private agencies). Workers have to report sickness and recovery within 2 days to their 
employer (or directly at the UWV if they do not have an employer) and employers have to inform 
the agency within one day. 
 
The entitlements of temporary agency workers to continued pay and sickness benefits differ across 
the phases in which the flex worker finds himself or herself concerning his work record and status 
at the temporary work agency (see the introductory section to this report on these phases). In the 
case of agency workers in phase 1 and 2 the employment contract (temporary agency agreement) 
ends immediately after the person has called in sick (this is stipulated by collective agreement). The 
worker will then receive a Sickness Act benefit directly from the UWV: 70% of the average day 
wage over the last 13 weeks. The collective agreement in the temporary work sector stipulates that 
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the temporary work agency has to supplement this benefit up to 91% (possibly less if the worker 
has worked less than 13 weeks or has taken more days off than he or she had reserved). The 
benefit takes effect on the third sick day – the first days are “waiting days” (the worker will receive 
some compensation for the second waiting day in the form of an extra allowance added to the gross 
hourly wage, either 0.71 percent - personnel in the health care sector - or 1.16% for technical 
professions). 
Workers in phase 3 and 4 receive continued pay at a rate of 91 percent of their wages as of the 
second sick day (the first day is a waiting day) for a maximum of one year or shorter if the 
temporary work contract expires earlier. If the worker remains ill afterwards he or she may be 
entitled to a sickness benefit (on the basis of the Sickness Benefit Act) or a Disability benefit (see 
below). 
 
Generally, on-call workers are entitled to 70 percent of the average wage during the last 13 weeks 
before the sickness. It is possible to agree that no payment is due during the first two days of 
sickness. The position of on-call workers with a pre agreement or zero hours contract depends on 
whether they fall ill during a “call period” or not. During a call period the worker is entitled to at 
least 70 percent of her or his wage (and at least the legal minimum wage). If a worker with a pre 
agreement remains ill after the call the employment contract ends and the employer is no longer 
required to continue payment. In that case a right to a sickness benefit may exist. 
A worker with a zero hours contract equally gets 70 percent of his or her wage. If the contract 
stipulates that the worker only gets paid for the hours worked no right to pay exist when the 
worker remains ill after being called upon. Moreover, as long as the employment contract continues 
no right to a Sickness benefit exist. The same applies to situations where the worker falls ill outside 
call periods.  
A worker with a minimum-maximum contract gets paid 70 percent of his or wage (and at least the 
minimum wage) with respect to the guaranteed working hours and the hours worked on top of 
these hours during a call. If the employment contract expires the worker may have a right to a 
Sickness benefit. 
 
A Disability benefit can be granted up to the age of 65 (when entitlement to old age pension takes 
effect). Rates and duration depend on the degree of disability, last earned (daily) wage and age on 
the commencing date; 7 categories of disability are being distinguished. In the following table 2.6 the 
rates are presented (in the calculation 100/108 is used because 8 percent of the benefit is reserved 
for a holiday allowance). 
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Table 2.6  Disability benefit rates based on disability percentage 
 
 
Disability %   Rate of benefit 
15% - 25%   14% of 100/108 x daily wage
25% - 35%   21% of 100/108 x daily wage
35% - 45%   28% of 100/108 x daily wage
45% - 55%   35% of 100/108 x daily wage
55% - 65%   42% of 100/108 x daily wage
65% - 80%   50.75% of 100/108 x daily wage
80% - 100%   70% of 100/108 x daily wage
For the calculation of the daily wage all elements of the wage of the worker are being taken into 
account. The maximum daily wage is € 159.99. A Disability benefit consists of two phases: a wage 
replacement benefit and a continued benefit (depending on the age of the worker) based on the so-
called continued daily wage.  After one year and subsequently every five years the disability 
percentage of the beneficiary is re-assed and the rate of the benefit will be adjusted if this has 
changed. In case of part-time workers it may be somewhat complicated to assess their degree of 
disability (as well as to answer the question about suitable work for these workers). 
If the Disability benefit together with the remaining family income is less than the social minimum 
(see section 2.2) the recipient can apply for an extra allowance. The Disability Benefits Act is being 
implemented by the Workers Insurances Agency.  
The Disability Benefits Act for the Self-employed (Wet arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering zelfstandigen, 
WAZ) offers a benefit to self-employed persons in case of long-term disability, pregnancy and 
maternity (first period after giving birth). Recipients must be more than 25% disabled to work, under 
the age of 65 and must have carried out labour in the year preceding disability with the aim of 
obtaining “insured” income. “Professionals”, including authors and freelance workers fall into the 
scope of this benefit scheme. The rate of the benefit depends on the degree of disability and the 
actual loss of income and cannot exceed 70 percent of the legal minimum wage. If the benefit falls 
below the social minimum it is possible to apply for an extra allowance. For the year 2002 the 
premium for this scheme is 8.8% of the so-called premium income of the self-employed person with 
a maximum of € 38118 per year. No premium is required for the first € 13160 of one’s income. 
For early-disabled persons (before the age of 17) and students without a work record a somewhat 
similar benefit scheme exists: the Disability Benefits Act for Early-disabled Persons (Wet 
arbeidsongeschiktheidsvoorziening jonggehandicapten, Wajong). 
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2.6 HEALTH CARE INSURANCE 
2.6.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 
Sickness and disability do not only cause a loss of income but also medical and other costs. In the 
Netherlands two schemes/insurances deal with these costs. The first one is the General Law on 
Special Costs of Sickness (Algemene wet bijzondere ziektekosten, AWBZ). This scheme covers special 
costs of sickness such as long-term hospitalisation and home care. The second one is the National 
Health Insurance Act (Ziekenfondswet, ZFW) a scheme that guarantees medical help from a certain 
programme (package) of services. 
 
2.6.2 ACCESS AND FACILITIES 
The General Law on Special Costs of Sickness is a national insurance that implies that every person 
living in the Netherlands, irrespective of age or nationality, is insured. For long-term care in a 
hospital or institution a (either modest or high, depending on the person’s situation) contribution is 
required. The premium for this scheme is paid in the form of a wage tax to the national insurances 
and is set at 10.25% in 2002. The scheme is implemented by the national and private health services. 
The National Health Insurance Act is an employees insurance (though, due its extending scope, it 
increasingly bears the characteristics of a national insurance), which generally also applies to 
recipients of social security benefits. Private insurance companies that have a legal obligation to 
accept applicants and guarantee a package of services and reimbursements carry out the scheme. 
No single National Insurance Institute exists (however at the national level two supervisory bodies 
exist,  CVZ and CTU). This scheme provides entitlements to care facilities and services (not to 
money), such as medical, doctor, hospital and dentist services. To be insured on the basis of this 
scheme a person’s gross annual wage must be below the “wage threshold”, which for the year 2002 
is set at € 30700 for persons below the age of 65 jaar and € 19550 for people of the age of 65 and 
up. In the case of breadwinners his or her partner (up to the age of 65) and children are also 
insured. The following wage components are being taken into account for the calculation of the right 
to insurance: 
•  the common weekly or monthly wage 
•  holiday allowances 
•  any other permanent allowances 
 
Self-employed persons have a right to insurance if their average income (for taxes) is less than € 
19.650 (2002) on the basis of a statement by the tax services. 
Both the employer and the employee are required to inform the National Health Insurance services 
about the start and the ending of the insurance. The premium consists of two parts: a variable part 
(7.95% of the wage or benefit; 6.25% of which to be paid by the employer) and a fixed part (€ 
155,40 per year in 2002).  
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Persons that earn more than the wage threshold have to get private insurance (most insurance 
services offer both private and a “public” insurance, so workers can switch easily in case of crossing 
the income threshold). For flex workers the situation can be complicated. In general a worker is 
eligible for national health insurance on the day that he or she (actually) works or, if one does not 
work, on those days that he or she gets paid at least half of his or her wages (article 6, sub 2 of the 
National Health Insurance Act). For certain groups of flex workers exceptions on this rule exist. 
One is e.g. also insured: 
in case no work is carried out because of a “normal interruption of work” , e.g. a weekend or 
national holiday, but this interruption may not last longer than one month and the employment 
relationship should continue during this period; 
if the nature of the employment relationship implies that one only works a certain part of the week 
or only during certain weeks. In this case one is insured during the other days of the week, but not 
during the weeks that one would not have worked (if one had not fallen ill). 
It is possible for the worker to extend a day or week insurance at the National Health Insurance in 
order to make sure that one is insured continuously. Furthermore, during sickness the insurance 
continues, unless one is not paid or does not get a benefit. 
The requirement that the employment relationship continues is problematic in the case of on-
call/stand by workers who have a pre agreement. This means that the worker is not required to 
actually (come to) work when he or she is called for. Only if the worker accepts the call a contract 
comes to exist in the legal sense (and only for that occasion). This is different for those on call/stand 
by workers who are required by the employer to stand by (either or not for a minimum number of 
hours) for work – a so-called employment contract with postponed performance. In this case the 
employment relationship continues beyond the days that one actually works. 
The flex worker’s health insurance ends when he or she takes more days off (for a holiday) than the 
number of days during which pay continues. If the holiday takes less than one month, the flex 
worker must pay a certain fee to the national health insurance agency for the days that he or she 
was not insured. If the holiday takes longer than one month the flex workers should get private 
insurance. This should be arranged for previously to the holiday. 
In practice on-call workers, holiday workers and other flex workers are often privately insured. 
However, as the length and nature of the flex workers employment relationship are not fixed, 
TWA’s assume flex workers to be insured for national health insurance (which is referred to as 
“mandatory insured”). Therefore national health insurance premiums are being withheld from their 
wages. Premiums paid to the private insurance company can be reimbursed (within certain limits) by 
the national health insurance agencies.  
30   UvA-AIAS Flexibility and Social Protection 
3. ACTUAL FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES: ILLUSTRATION 
 
From the foregoing it should be clear that flex workers are facing problems regarding the so-called 
employees insurances (unemployment, sickness and disability benefits), as opposed to the national 
insurances. These problems are particularly related to two issues: 1) whether an employment 
relationship exist and, thus, whether the worker is insured for the employees insurances or not; this 
in view of the “loose” nature of the employment relationship in the case of flex work 2) the fact that 
entitlements to benefits mirror the nature and size of work patterns (this becomes manifest in the 
concept “daily wage”, as used in the employees insurances – see section 2 above).  
 
Empirical research supports these conclusions. Vriend and Korpel (1990) showed that the 
judgments of social insurance officers (at the social insurances agencies) varied significantly in 
(fictitious) cases of flex workers applying for benefits. Deviations with respect to the Unemployment 
benefit scheme were related to the assessment of a (renewed) entitlement to a benefit, the 
calculation of the loss of working hours, the duration of the basic benefit period and, notably, the 
rate of the benefit. Regarding the Sickness benefit scheme nearly all variety in judgements was 
related to the rate of the benefit due to the obscurity in the law with respect to the reference 
period.  
Based on interviews with experts in the field Baenen and Bosch (1998) concluded that the legal 
position of flexible workforces is unclear or not regulated in a number of respects. E.g. it is not 
always clear whether a person conducts work on the basis of an employment contract. Home 
workers, freelance workers and on-call workers are frequently not insured for the Sickness benefit 
scheme and the Unemployment benefit scheme. This applies notably to on-call workers without 
guaranteed working hours during the periods when they are not working. These workers may also 
be, without knowing, not insured for the National Health scheme during these periods. Moreover, 
many flex workers are not being enlisted by their employer at the insurance agencies. Lack of 
knowledge of both employer and workers thus results in the under-use of social insurance 
(estimation: 5-10 percent of the total population of persons entitled to social insurance). Other 
problems are related to insurance for the Sickness benefits scheme during unpaid leave, to the 
combined (weeks and years) requirements for the Unemployment benefits scheme and to the so-
called period requirements (i.e. the days that work is actually conducted) which, in turn, influence 
the calculation of the daily wage (this wage can thus vary, depending on the period that is taken into 
account). 
Klein Hesselink et al. (1998) studied a (representative) sample of 1030 flex workers. They calculated 
that 10.4 percent of the Dutch working populations could be referred to as “flex worker”. Their 
main conclusions are that two third of the flex workers is protected against the loss income due to 
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sickness. Besides some 80 percent of the flex workers meet the weeks requirement in the 
Unemployment Benefits scheme and thus are entitled to a benefit in case of unemployment. Yet, 
many flex workers do not use the opportunities to receive a benefit and only a minority of those 
workers (13.5 percent) has been denied a benefit. A much greater share of the workers has not 
applied for a benefit, either because they do not think they are entitled to a benefit or do not need 
one. Especially unemployed flex workers usually have other sources of income, either of their own 
or from a partner in their household, and refrain from applying for a benefit. 
The studies summarized above were all conducted before the Flexibility and Security Act came into 
force (1 January 1999). As indicated in the introduction to this report, this law aims at improving the 
social protection of flex workers while at the same time enhancing flexibility in the labour market. 
However, the emphasis is first on labour law and employment protection and more indirectly on 
social security. Not withstanding the introduction of the so-called presumptions of law regarding the 
possible employee status of flex workers and the minimum hours on-call workers have to be paid, 
the general opinion is that the social security position of flex workers has not changed significantly. 
 
There is growing evidence on the effects of the flexibility and security legislation. A first ‘scan’ 
revealed ‘mixed feelings’ among employers, workers and their representatives, which are largely the 
result of the need to think through and implement the consequences of the new legislation and to 
reorganize administrative procedures (Grijpstra et al., 1999). A second evaluation indicated that, 
following the introduction of the Flexibility and Security Act, there has been a shift from temporary 
to permanent employment contracts (Klaver et al., 2000). About 145,000 existing temporary 
contracts have been converted into new temporary contracts and nearly 72,000 temporary 
contracts have been converted into permanent contracts. A total of 86,000 temporary contracts 
were not renewed. The contracts of 25,000 on-call workers were not renewed, and a further 
93,000 on-call workers became either temporary agency workers or changed to fixed-hours or 
fixed-term contracts. 
In comparison with the first evaluation, positive experiences among both employers (including 
TWA,s) and flexible workers now generally outweigh negative experiences. Half of the employers 
involved in the second evaluation had a favourable opinion of the Act (compared to a third in 1999). 
However, the views of those running TWAs are less favourable, with only a third expressing 
positive opinions (in 1999, a quarter of the these employers had been positive about the Act). 
Flexible workers are less likely to attribute negative developments in their employment relationship 
to the Act. The researchers conclude that firms and workers are getting used to the new rules. 
Knowledge of the law is fairly widespread, though it is still important to provide information for 
those engaged in collective bargaining as well as to individuals (Klaver et al., 2000). The Minister of 
Social Affairs and Employment stated that he agreed with the researchers that the results of the 
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study are influenced by the current favourable economic conditions, but he also concludes that the 
legislation on flexibility and security does not represent a barrier to favourable developments in the 
labour market. 
The results of a recently conducted, comprehensive evaluation (Van den Toren et al., 2002) are 
much in line with the previous evaluations. A first observation is that the share of flex workers has 
decreased between 1998 and 2000, notably due to a decline of on-call workers. The presumptions 
of law, which were introduced by the law, appear to have had a preventive effect in the form of 
differently and more adequately formulated contracts. Yet, only in a minority of cases (about 10 
percent) where workers work more hours than agreed by contract, an appeal is made on the basis 
of presumptions of law. Many flex workers do not rely on the presumptions in order to maintain 
their flexibility towards the employer. The legislator’s expectations regarding the guaranteed wage 
for on-call workers have not been met yet. One sixth of the employers state that they do not pay 
the guaranteed minimum of 3 hours, whereas one third of the on-call workers contend not to be 
paid according to the legal requirements.  
The 4-phases system is well known among temporary agency workers; half of the workers reports 
to be informed by the agency on the phase that applies to them. The majority of temporary work 
agencies (90%) has introduced a pension scheme for the temporary workers; more than half of the 
worker reports that they are building up pension rights. As mentioned in section 2 temporary 
agency workers in phase 1 and 2 are entitled to a Sickness benefit and workers in phase 3 and 4 are 
entitled to continued pay. One third of the latter category of workers is not aware of this 
entitlement and a quarter of the workers do not receive a benefit when they fall ill. Workers in 
phase 3 and 4 seem to have more problems than their counterparts in phase 1 and 2. 
Most flex workers that involuntary quit their job and become unemployed do not receive an 
Unemployment benefit. The most prominent reason for this is that the workers do not apply for 
such a benefit (the largest category of these workers, some 25 percent, refrain from applying for a 
benefit because they already have a new job, or expect to have one soon; 17 percent of the workers 
reports “no need” for a benefit, 15 percent think they are not entitled to a benefit and 7 percent 
feels applying for a benefit is too much bother). In 80 percent of the applications the benefit is 
granted by the social insurance agency. Cases in which the application is turned down are often 
related to the existence of a continued pay obligation on the part of the employer. The social 
insurance agencies have become more strict in view of this continued pay obligation: workers are 
being referred back to their employer, but then stop pursuing their rights (notably in the building 
and agricultural sectors) or must take more efforts to carry through their claim. In the latter case a 
higher income is obtained, in the former case this has a negative effect on flex workers’ income 
protection. 
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4 PROSPECTS 
 
O n  s h o r t  n o t i c e  n o  r e f o r m  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  s y s t e m  i s  b e i n g  c o n s i d e r e d  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  
position of flex workers. Rather, attention is paid to possible (and fundamental) reform of the 
system to match the increasing diversity and variety in people’s life cycles, life courses and career 
patterns and preferences, as well as to promote and facilitate the balancing of work and care 
commitments (see Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2001 and 2002; Trommel, 1997). 
Evidently, flex workers can be expected to benefit from this reform. 
Specific reform measures, aimed at the position of flex workers – on-call workers in particular – 
may evolve from the evaluation of the Flexibility and Security Act, as described in section 3 of this 
report. As already indicated, one of the key issues is the calculation of entitlements on the basis of 
reference periods. Since 1996 it has been repeatedly suggested (e.g. by the Dutch Labour Party and 
the Confederation of Trade Unions, see FNV, 2001) that entitlements be based on the number of 
hours worked, rather than on days or weeks). In such a system a worker would be “building up” 
entitlements to benefits by the hour. Though this system may seem attractive because of its 
simplicity, complications are being envisaged. Workers need to be insured from the first day of 
work against certain events that may lead to long-term reliance on social insurance, irrespective of 
the short duration of the insurance.  
A second point of attention pertains to pension entitlements for flex workers. Though this issue has 
been discussed extensively (e.g. in the Dutch Labour Foundation) and the Dutch system is being 
praised for its state pension rights, it is clear that ongoing reforms are needed. 
Third there is the availability of facilities and arrangements for workers in general to balance work 
and private responsibilities. In 2004 a Law on basic facilities for childcare will be introduced that will 
support parents in arranging for childcare facilities.  
Fourth and last to be mentioned are the unremitting attempts and discussions with respect to the 
reform of the Disability Benefit scheme in view of the high disability rates in the Netherlands (almost 
one million persons being labelled disabled to work among a working population of some 7 million 
people, cp. Oorschot & Boos, 2001). At this point it hard to predict what the direction of this 
reform will be and whether it will be to the advantage or disadvantage of flex workers. 
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